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MONEY AND MARKETS 1 
Abstract 
This paper studies the efficiency properties with respect 
to transactions cost of a trading post set-up vis-a-vis a mar-
ketless trading arrangement under the well-known frame-work 
of Ostroy and Starr (1974). It is revealed from this exercise 
that the social institute of money works better when coupled 
with the social institution of markets and thereby provid-
ing an explanation of why, historically speaking, money and 
markets go hand in hand. 
1. Introduct ion 
. The last two decades have witnessed the gradual emer-
gence of a variety of models to explain the superiority of 
monetary over non-monetary trade from the point of view 
of transactions cost. In order to capture the essence of the 
problem, however, these models have generally dealt with in-
stitutionally vacuous economies, at least insofar as the traders 
are seen to confront each other in the absence of organized 
markets (Ostroy and Starr (1974), Jones (1976), Kiyotaki 
and Wright (1989) etc.). On the other hand, there is another 
stream of literature (see Foley (1970), Wallace (1972) etc.) 
'The author wishes to acknowledge many useful discussions with Di-
pankar Dasgupta 
2" 
which concentrates exclusively on models which recognize the 
existence of markets or trading posts (of different forms, eg. 
wholesale or retail) to deal with exchanges of different pairs 
of goods. 
The present paper is an attempt to marry the above two 
strands of theory in an order to explain the simultaneous 
existence of monetary trade and market specialization. More 
precisely, we try to examine the effect (on transactions cost) 
of combining the social institution of markets with monetary 
exchanges. In a recent work with a different approach but 
similar flavour, Starr and Stinchcombe (forthcoming) have 
shown how a set-up with trading posts using a medium of 
exchange can dominate a trading post set-up involving barter 
trades alone. 
To study this issue we consider a pioneering contribution 
to the literature, viz. that of Ostroy and Starr (1974,1990). 
As is well-known, Ostroy and Starr deal with the question of 
feasibility. More specifically, they look for a condition to be 
satisfied by a good which, if used as a medium of exchange 
by the individual traders, can attain their desired allocations 
within a reasonable period of time. By introducing trading 
posts in the Ostroy-Starr set-up one can conclude that the 
time taken to attain the agents' desired allocations to each 
given degree of approximation is bounded above irrespec-
tive of the size of the economy; whereas no such bound may 
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exists in a marketless economy. Note, however, that in cer-
tain situations even in the presence of trading posts the time 
taken to attain the desired allocation exactly may not remain 
bounded as the economy becomes large. 
The paper is arranged as follows. The next section com-
pares the trading post set-up with the marketless trading 
arrangement. A concluding section sums up the findings. 
2. Transactions Cost : Trading Posts vs Marketless 
Set-up : 
We consider an economy consisting of K traders (indexed 
by k) and n commodities (indexed by c), the n-th commodity, 
denoted by M, being earmarked to serve as the medium of 
exchange. The set of all traders is denoted by K also and 
the set of commodities other than the n-th good by C. The 
initial endowments of the K traders are depicted by the Kx n 
matrix W = |Kc | | , where wkc represents the level of good c 
in the initial endowment of agent k. The utility function of 
agent k is Uk : JR'| _ jR, k = 1 , 2 , K . Prices 
P'= (j>l,"-,Pn) 
are exogenously given at the equilibrium levels. Given the 
prices and the initial endowments, the Walrasian excess de-
mands for the economy are given by the K xn matrix Z = 
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\\zkc\l where zkc is the level of agent fc's excess demand for 
(or supply of) good c. 
Similarly, the final demands are given by the Kxn matrix 
x = w + Z = \\xkc\\, where xkc is the level of good c finally 
consumed by agent k. 
Thus, the economy under study is characterized by (W, Z, i 
where p is the transpose of p'. The following properties are 
assumed : 
(U.l) The value of total excess demand equals zero, which 
can be represented as Z.p = 0, where the price of the 
n-th good pm is assumed to be positive. 
(U.2) The total quantity of a particular good purchased is 
exactly equal to the aggregate amount of that good 
sold. In other words, Z = 0 , where Zk represents 
k ~k 
the k-th row vector of Z. 
(U.3) Z > - W, the inequality is assumed to hold entrywise. 
It implies that the final consumption of each good by 
every agent is non-negative. 
The trading arrangement taken up by Ostroy and Starr is 
based on the assumption that in order to explore the trad-
ing possibilities, agents meet each other in pairs following an 
arbitrary sequence of meetings. This ad hoc sequence in no 
way depends on the goods an agent desires to demand and 
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supply. Further, when one pair meets, other pairs are allowed 
to meet simultaneously. 
For the system described so far suppose the following con-
dition introduced by Ostroy and Starr (1974) is satisfied 
X] PcM* < PMWkM,Vh (1) 
cyLM 
where, 
c is the index for commodities, k the index for agents, M 
the commodity earmarked to denote the medium of exchange, 
pc is the equilibrium price of good c, is the excess demand 
(supply) for (of) good c for agent k, [zkc}+= max[0,^c], wkM 
is the initial endowment of good M for agent k. 
Therefore, the left hand side of inequality (1) shows the 
total value of the agent fc's desired purchase of goods other 
than M. On the other hand, the right hand side of (1) ex-
presses the value of the initial endowment of good M for 
agent k. Hence, condition (1) guarantees the fact that an 
agent possesses enough money in his initial endowment to 
cover his desired purchases of all the remaining goods. 
It is shown in the literature that if there exists a commod-
ity M satisfying condition (1) above in any given competi-
tive economy with a finite population, then using that good 
as a medium of exchange an agent can fulfill his/her excess 
demands within one round i.e., the time required for each 
agent to meet every other agent once and only once. The 
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result holds irrespective of the sequence in which the agents 
meet in a marketless arrangement.2 
Suppose now we ask whether a medium of exchange sat-
isfying such a condition can function better in a trading post 
set-up. Thus, we consider an economy with trading posts or 
•separate markets for dealing with each good against M. Each 
agent visits only those markets which are relevant for him. 
Depending on the levels of excess demand vectors and a 
specific sequence of meeting between the agents or visiting 
markets a marketless arrangement may sometime take less 
time than a trading post set-up. However, in general for 
economies with large population the advantages of the social 
institution of markets is clearly revealed. To see this, an ap-
propriate framework to consider may be that of Debreu and 
Scarf (1963). More precisely, the economy consists of specific 
classes of agents where agents belonging to a particular class 
have identical characteristics. In other words, the set-up un-
der consideration is a replication of a smaller economy. We 
represent an economy of this nature satisfying condition (1) 
by E and its u times replication by Eu. 
2 A more plausible feasibility criterion compared to (1) is that a good, 
say M, is demanded in positive quantity by every agent i.e., 
ZkM + WkM > o, for all k 
. Such a gftpd can be used as a medium to attain equilibrium in finite 
time. (See; rfajeev(l990) and Dasgupta and Rajeev (forthcoming). 
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We consider an arrangement where all markets are func-
tioning simultaneously and an agent chooses a trading post 
at, random from the set of trading posts he desires to visit 
(which depends on the goods he wishes to demand and sup-
ply). In a parallel fashion we assume for the marketless trad-
ing arrangement that agents meet each other at random. We 
can now compare the average time involved for all possible 
sequences of meetings, i.e. ETml, with the corresponding 
ETtp-
In the case of the marketless trading arrangement, an 
agent meets another agent at random without any reference 
to the goods they want to exchange. It is assumed to take one 
unit of time to confront any agent and exchange (if passible). 
We may choose rational numbers from [z,-c -e ,Zi c +e] and 
[zjC—e, ZjC+£} for all c and denote them respectively by xl and 
Qcj respectively. We then consider the problem of achieving 
these rational values instead of the original z ^ s and z,c's. 
The total time needed to arrive at the e-neighbourhood of 
a competitive allocation would be represented by [Trp](e, u). 
Parallel notations, viz. [Tml](£, v) would be used to denote 
the same for the alternative marketless framework. For a 
set-up of this nature we have the following results. 
Proposi t ion 1 For an economy Eu described above, there 
exists an integer N(e) independent of u s.t 
E(fTP(e,u))<N(e) ,Vu 
8' 
and hence 
Prob{TTp(e, r)) < oo, for any v] = 1. 
P r o o f : See Appendix. 
Note that if the original excess demands were themselves 
rational numbers, then the above result would go through 
without the need for the e approximation. 
On the other hand, a conclusion as general as the above 
does not hold for the marketless trading arrangement. In 
fact, it is possible to construct a large number of economies 
(with Zkc € Q, the set of rational numbers, Vk, Vc) where 
expected time taken in a marketless trading scheme diverges 
as v increases. More precisely, 
Proposi t ion 2 There exists at least one economy of the type 
Ev for which 
E(Tml{
u
)) —*
 0 0 a s v 0 0 
P r o o f : See Appendix. 
Once again this result shows clearly the advantages of 
a trading post set-up for large economies. Also, from the 
Remark (in the Appendix) it is clear that one can construct 
large number of competitive economies where Proposition2 
holds. 
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It is important to emphasize the fact that in the case of 
the above result (Proposition 1) the rational approximation 
played a crucial role. In fact it would be impossible to estab-
lish the uniform bound if the agents' excess demand vectors 
were comprised of irrational components and they tried to 
achieve these demand points exactly. As Example 1 below 
shows clearly, no such uniform bound would exist even if the 
economy with trading posts consists of two goods. 
Example 1: Consider an economy E having two goods 
(say, c and M) and 3 demanders and 3 suppliers with ex-
cess demands and supplies for good c against M. Let zf and 
z? (i,j = 1,2,3) denote respectively the excess demands 
and excess supplies of the i-th and ;- th agents for good c 
with 
( 4 4 ^ ) = (1,V2. V/3) 
( r f ,z 2 ' , z | )=( l ,>/2 , v/3) 
Initial endowments of the (excess) demanders are repre-
sented by w( = (0, 1 = (0, v / 2 = (0, ^3), 
where the first components refer to good c and the second 
components refer to good M. Similarly\initial endowments 
of the (excess) suppliers are given by, wf = (1, O ) , ^ = 
(y/2, 0) and = (\/3, 0). It can be easily checked that 
condition (1) of Ostroy and Starr is trivially satisfied here 
(where the equilibrium price vector p' = (1,1)). 
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From zf s and z)'s it is clear that z^z^z^z^ € QJ, the 
set. of irrational numbers. Also rank (1, \/2, y/3) = 3, in the 
field of integers. 
Given the above competitive economy, consider the fol-
lowing sequence of meetings. The first demander meets the 5 
first supplier, the second demander meets the second supplier 
and so on as depicted through the following diagrammatic 
scheme: 
Demander Supplier 
1 - 1 
2 —> 2 
3 —> 3 
Let the time taken in attaining equilibrium (starting from 
the initial endowments) when this economy replicates v times 
be denoted by Ttp{u). Clearly, Ttp{ 1) = 1 for the aforemen-
tioned sequence of meetings. 
Let us now consider a i/ = 3 times replication of this 
economy. That is, there are 9 demanders as well as suppliers. 
Let 
{zi zj, . . . , zg) = (1, y/2, V3,1,..., v/3). 
Similarly 
W4~:>4) = ( v/3) 
Consider the following sequence of meetings shown by the 
arrows in the figure below. Arrangement I is related to the 
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first 3 demanders and suppliers. Similarly, Arrangement II is 
related to the next 3 demanders and suppliers (viz. 4.5 and 
6) and so on. 
Arrangement I 
Demander Supplier 
1 1 
Arrangement II 
Demander 
4 
5 
6 
Supplier 
4 
5 
6 
2 —• 2 
3 — 3 
Arrangement III 
Demander Supplier 
8 8 
9 9 
Let Vfd{Vjs) denote demander (supplier) i's (f s) unsatis-
fied demand (supply) for (of) good c at the beginning of time 
period t. Thus, from trading arrangement I, 
v?d = v& = vll = vl\ = vl = vzs'= 0. 
From trading arrangement II 
=s/3-l,Vis = V2- 1, V* = V3-V2 
Thus, 3 agents get satisfied and 3 agents remain to be 
satisfied. The reason behind this is quite simple. When two 
agents meet, at least one of them would get satisfied. But not 
12' 
more than 3 traders would get satisfied because |1 - \/2\ ^ 
| v / 2 - v / 3 | # | v / 3 - l | ^ 0 . 
In trading arrangement. Ill for the same reason, only 3 
agents would be satisfied and 
V£d = y f i - 1%V& = VS-V2,V9] = Vs-1 
In period 2, consider the following sequence of meetings. 
Demander Supplier 
6 —• 9 
8 5 
9 —> 6 
This would result in all the agents reaching equilibrium 
in two periods. Thus, 
T (3) = 2 
As a next step consider the u = 32 times replication of 
this economy and a similar sequence of meetings. One can 
easily check that T(32) = 3 so on. 
Proceeding similarly it can be shown that in general there 
exists at least one sequence of meetings s.t. T(3£) = t + 
1 and hence the time taken for attaining equilibrium rises 
unboundedly as the economy replicates indefinitely. 
Note: 1. The above example shows that if we allow the ex-
cess demand vectors to take irrational values then one can 
construct economies where even in the presence of markets 
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equilibrium can take infinite time. However this certainly 
does not rule out the possibility that there can exist economies 
with irrational demand and supply vectors where time needed 
to attain equilibrium is finite. A trivial example is where 
demand and supply vectors contain identical irrational ele-
ments. 
2. When the demand and supply figures are rational num-
bers, the time taken to attain ones desired bundle cannot go 
to infinity due to the following reason. Let g be the great-
est common divisor of the non-zero zkc values, for all k and 
for all c. That is zkc = g.Ikc, where Ikc is a natural num-
ber. Hence any pairwise meeting would reduce the agents' 
excess demands and supplies at least by g. Since zkc's are 
finite, after a finite number of stages every agent would reach 
equilibrium. 
A greatest common divisor need not exist when some z i c 's 
are irrational numbers. Therefore, a fixed reduction in excess 
demands and supplies after each pairwise meeting cannot be 
ensured for all such competitive economies. This gives rise to 
the possibility that there can exist economies where the un-
satisfied excess demand is reduced by a decreasing sequence 
requiring in its turn infinite time to satisfy ones demand. 
4. Conclusion: 
This paper formally establishes the intuitively clear fact 
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that from the point of view of time as a transactions cost, a 
trading post set-up dominates a marketless trading arrange 
ment. Thus, money and markets complement each other. 
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A p p e n d i x 
P r o o f of Propos i t ion 1 
We choose rational numbers from [zic - £,z ic + e] and 
[- c - £,zJC + e] for all c and denote them respectively by 
x f a n d QJ respectively. We then consider the problem of 
a c h i e v i n g ' t h e s e rational values instead of the original z ic 's 
and Zjc's. The associated time cost would then be denoted 
by [Tc]e- An exactly analogous problem would be considered 
for each of the (n - 1) trading posts that exists for dealing 
with each good against M (the medium of exchange). Let 
ICsc and K? represent respectively the sets of suppliers and 
demanders of good c. 
Let g be the greatest common divisor of the elements of 
the set 
A = {xlny.ceCje K?,j e Ksc) 
That is, g is the largest real number such that zkc = g.hc V fc, V 
where Ikc is a natural number. 
At each period, an agent chooses a trading post at random 
from the set of trading posts he wishes of visit. Let rfk denote 
the number of trading posts which k wishes to visit at the 
beginning of time period t. Let 
4 = { c : | V & | > ( W M } 
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then 
rfk = 
Since \Vj.c\ is a decreasing function of therefore, 77^. de-
creases in time. 
According to our assumption, at period i, agent k chooses 
a trading post with probability = l/rj^ 
Let us denote the probability for a particular demander 
i(G K**, the set of unsatisfied demanders of good c at the 
beginning of time period t) being present in trading post 
(c, M) at period t by p\c. Hence, 
t 1 1 
Similarly, for a supplier j(€ i f f ' ) 
p)c > "T (2) J n — 1 
We denote by <5£ and -0c respectively the actual number 
of demanders and suppliers present in trading post (c, M), 
at time period t. The following, relations can hold between 
51 and tt 
(i) min = £ 
This implies each buyer would meet a seller with proba-
bility 1 and hence unsatisfied demand of each buyer present 
would reduce at least by g. 
(ii) min 
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This implies unsatisfied supply of each seller present would 
be reduced at least by g. 
(iii) 6[ = tt 
This implies excess unsatisfied supply a.s well as demand 
of the respective agents would be reduced at least by g. 
At each period t, the expected reduction of i's (i € Kj?1) 
unsatisfied demand and/or j's(j G K^) unsatisfied supply Is 
at least 
E(Ac9) > ^ T . n — I 
and 
E{p)cg)>-^, j e Kf* J n — 1 
The alternatives depend on (i), (ii) and (iii) above. 
Let at time period t, R* be the reduction that occurs to 
the expression 
The (c, M) trading post would be completely cleared (i.e. 
— 0) after at most r periods if 
* ' 1 -
r 
t=l 
where 
=e c >z l c ,V ie A f 
and 
\zhc>\z]c\yjeKsc,j^h£Ksc 
1-9 
We have, 
E(j2Rt) = m£,Rt\T) 
t=i t=i 
= EE{Rl + ... + Rr) 
= E{ERl+ER2 + ...+ERt} 
9 
i.e. 
E ( f c ) < (
w
 ~ l)iz£c + \zhc\] 
9 
which is independent of //. 
A similar exercise can be performed for other trading 
pasts. Adding over all c we get, 
E{Ttp{u)) < Ar(e)-, independent of u. 
Coming now to the second part of the result, consider the 
sequence of random variables fTp(u). We have shown that 
E{TTP(V)) < N{e) V// 
•• Prob { T j p { u ) < oo for any v} = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2 : 
Consider an economy with 2 types of agents, viz. type 
1 and type 2 and two goods, to be called c and M. The 
total number of type 1 agents is equal to the total number of 
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type 2 agents. Each type 1 agent has one unit of good c and 
demands in return 1 unit of good M. A type 2 trader on the 
other hand has one unit of good M and demands in return 1 
unit of good c. 
It is clear that when a type 1 agent meets a type 2 agent, 
they can trade and attain their desired commodity bundles. 
Suppose each type consists of X number of agents. Then, 
the probability that an arbitrary type 1 agent, say k, meets 
a complementary trading partner (i.e. a type 2 agent) in the 
first period is 
Pi = = — U - < I if X > 2. P1 X + X - 1 2 - i " 3 
The denominator of this probability (i.e. X +X - 1) refers 
to the total number of agents excluding k and the numerator 
(i.e. X) represents the number of complementary trading 
partners. 
The probability of not meeting any type 2 agent by k in 
the first period is 
X ^ 1 
1 - pi = 1 - - 3' 
Let Xf denote the number of type 1 agents (or, equiva-
lently type 2 agents) remaining unsatisfied at the beginning 
of time period t. 
x f = x 
21 
Clearly, X?,t> 1, is a random variable and hence we would 
be concerned here with EX?. Since the probability of re-
maining unsatisfied during the first period is (1 - ^ y ) and 
there are a total of X type 1 traders in the economy 
E(X?) = X.(l - > \X. 
Let us define an indicator function 
Ixa=x = 1, \SX? = x 
= 0, otherwise 
Then we can write 
E(X?) = E(X?Ixu=l + X\lx ir>2) 
= E(X¥lxv=i) + E{X?Ixu> 2) 
Let us now calculate 
7=2 
E(X
u
2
I
x
^
2
) > (• 
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Let us consider period t = 3. Suppose at the beginning of 
the third period, is the number of unsatisfied agents. The 
probability that a type 1 agent gets satisfied during period 2 
is 
xS 
X<J+X»-1 
At the beginning of period t = 2,Xo agents have re-
mained unsatisfied and they have a probability (1 - p?) of 
remaining unsatisfied during the third period 
,. E(xl7) = EE(xf\x?) 
= w n -
2 
vU 
i - s a ^ r ^ - j rUf 1 2 TV: 
L2 
vU 
0 + E I * 2 t r ( 1 " i 
> 
As before in an exactly parallel manner let us calculate 
23 
xu 
= E ^ P r i X l 1 = 7 ] 
7=2 
= ^ ( l - ^ a - p f - 1 ) ] 
[^=1 + 7Xj7>2] 
= 0 + E[Af (1 - - p f -
> \E[Xl2^-P2)Ixv>J 
••• (Af /^> 2 ) > (i)4X (4) 
Using (4), we get as before 
E{XY) > \E(X?IXV>2) 
Uy 1 1 
In general, 
E(X t ) = 32(t-2)+l _ 3 ^ 3 
If we replicate the economy v times 
24' 
Let us define T„ as 
1/ Y 
f , = m i n { t | ^ 3 < 2 } 
Then, 
ET
M
l{") > % 
Now given any t, we can find a u s.t,. 
32t-l -
as v —• oo, fv —> oo, and hence ETml{j/) —> oo. • 
Remark From this example it is clear that the result holds 
even when we consider a similar economy with 4 types of 
agents (each type having X agents) and 4 commodities. A 
type 3 agent demands one unit of good 3 against one unit of 
good 4. A type 4 agent demands one unit of good 4 against 
one unit of good 3 and so on. Each type (type 3 and 4) has 
one unit of good M so that condition (1) is satisfied. Thus, 
a type 3 agent can trade only when he meets a type 4 agent 
and vice-versa. 
In a parallel fashion we can consider 6 types of agents 
with 6 goods in the economy and so on. Thereby, one can 
construct a large member of competitive economies where 
Proposition 2 holds. 
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